Derailed by the D.C. Circuit: Getting Network Management Regulation Back on Track by Mulligan, Edward B., V
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 62 | Issue 3 Article 5
6-2010
Derailed by the D.C. Circuit: Getting Network
Management Regulation Back on Track
Edward B. Mulligan V
Indiana University Maurer School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, Internet Law
Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Litigation Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mulligan, Edward B. V (2010) "Derailed by the D.C. Circuit: Getting Network Management Regulation Back on Track," Federal
Communications Law Journal: Vol. 62: Iss. 3, Article 5.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol62/iss3/5
Derailed by the D.C. Circuit: Getting
Network Management Regulation
Back on Track
Edward B. Mulligan V*
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 634
II. BACKGROUND-NETWORK MANAGEMENT .......................... 636
A. Understanding Network Management .......................... 636
B. Precursors to the Regulation of Network Management
P ractices ........................................................................ 638
C. The FCC Condemns Comcast's Network Management
P ractices ........................................................................ 639
1. Comcast's Former Network Management
Practices .................................................................. 639
2. The FCC's Analysis of Comcast's Practices ........... 642
3. Post-Order Fallout for Comcast and Other ISPs ..... 644
D. Comcast's Response to the FCC Order ........................ 644
E. The D.C. Circuit Vacates the FCC Order ..................... 645
F. Comcast and the FCC Respond to the D.C. Circuit
D ecision ......................................................................... 64 8
III. WHAT NEXT? JURISDICTION AND BEYOND ........................... 650
* Edward, better known as "Ned," graduated cum laude from Dickinson College,
where he received a Bachelor of Arts in economics. As a law student, Ned served as
Executive Editor of Volume 62 of the Federal Communications Law Journal. Ned expects
to receive his Juris Doctor degree from Indiana University Maurer School of Law in May
2010. First and foremost, Ned would like to thank his fianc6e, Laura MacLeod, for her love
and support throughout the Note writing process and, more generally, law school. He would
also like to express his appreciation for the members of the Federal Communications Law
Journal who left this Note better than they found it.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
A. Securing Jurisdiction over Network Management
P ractices ........................................................................ 650
B. Lingering Hurdles to an Open Internet-How the
FCC Order Failed ........................................................ 652
1. Protocol-Agnostic Network Management ............... 652
2. Excessive Use Threshold ........................................ 656
3. Consumer D isclosure .............................................. 658
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS-BEYOND JURISDICTION,
REGULATIONS ARE NEEDED .................................................. 660
V . CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 662
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, the Internet has become one of the world's
most popular and valuable tools. In fact, over the last nine years alone, the
percentage of American adults using the Internet has increased over
twenty-five percent-from fifty-three percent in 2000 to seventy-nine
percent in 2009.' Because Americans have become increasingly reliant on
the Internet in the course of their daily lives, the need for Internet
regulation has become a topic of public debate.2 Growing concerns about
how Internet service providers (ISPs) manage network traffic have fueled
this already-heated debate.3 While policymakers have remained reluctant to
formally regulate the Internet, actions taken in recent years have indicated a
shift in this policy-a sign that the days of a largely unregulated Internet
may be coming to an end.
Despite this trend, recent attempts by the FCC to implement Internet
regulations-particularly those addressing network management
practices-have faltered. The most recent setback is the D.C. Circuit's
decision in Comcast v. FCC.4 In that appeal, Comcast asked the D.C.
Circuit to determine whether the FCC had the requisite authority to regulate
its network management practices-a claim the FCC made in its August
2008 Memorandum Decision and Order ("FCC Order" or "Order").5 The
1. See U.S. Census Bureau, Table 1121-Adult Computer and Adult Internet Users by
Selected Characteristics: 2000 to 2009, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/
statab/2010/tables/10s 121 .pdf.
2. See, e.g., Cade Metz, US. Cable Giant To Throttle P2P, THE REGISTER, Jan. 28,
2009, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/01/28/coxtraffic-delay/.
3. See id.
4. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2010).
5. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23
F.C.C.R. 13028, para. 1 (2008) [hereinafter FCC Order]. In that Memorandum Opinion and
Order ("FCC Order" or "Order"), the FCC took a major step toward regulation by
condemning Comcast Corporation's network management practices as both
"discriminatory" and "arbitrary." Id. The FCC concluded that Comcast's network
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D.C. Circuit first acknowledged that the Communications Act of 1934 did
not grant the FCC explicit authority over cable Internet providers.6 The
court then considered whether the FCC had ancillary authority to regulate
network management practices.7 It answered this question in the negative
as well.8
So, as of the publication of this Note, the FCC does not have the
requisite authority to regulate network management practices.9 As the
discriminatory nature of Comcast's former network management practices
illustrates, that regulation is needed in this area. Therefore, conceding
jurisdiction should not be an option for the FCC. It is merely the first step
in getting its plans for network management regulation back on track. In
fact, there are a variety of circumstances under which the FCC could gain
authority over cable Internet providers. 0 These include a possible appeal to
and reversal by the United States Supreme Court of the D.C. Circuit's
decision, congressional action granting the FCC explicit authority, or
reclassifying cable Internet service so that it falls within the FCC's
authority under either Title II or VI of the Communications Act (which
grant the FCC explicit authority to regulate "telecommunications services"
and "cable services," respectively)." However, as this Note cautions,
overcoming the jurisdictional problem is only the first step of many
required to solve the FCC's Internet regulation problems. More is needed,
as evidenced by Comcast's failed attempt at compliance with the now-
vacated FCC Order. The FCC must adopt clear rules that set identifiable
boundaries for network management, enforced by monitoring procedures
and serious consequences in the case of noncompliance.
Part II of this Note sets forth the historical context that gave rise to the
current state of affairs, including a discussion of the FCC Order and the
D.C. Circuit's recent decision. Part III anticipates how the FCC might
"reestablish" jurisdiction over cable Internet providers in the future, while
cautioning that, because other problems persist, jurisdiction is only the first
step. In support of the latter assertion, Part III.B demonstrates how
management practices discriminated among certain applications and protocols by targeting
peer-to-peer (P2P) uploads and downloads and subjecting them to slowdown regardless of
whether the network was congested. See id. at para. 41. In its Order, the FCC required that
Comcast take the following actions: (1) disclose, in detail, its discriminatory network
management practices; (2) implement a new network management practice by the end of
2008 that would comply with the FCC's Internet principles; and (3) disclose the nature of
any new practice to the FCC and subscribers. Id. at para. 54.
6. Comast Corp., No. 08-1291, slip op. at 5.
7. Id. slip op. at 6.
8. Id. slip op. at 36.
9. See id.
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. Id.
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Comcast's new practices failed to comply with the framework set forth in
the FCC Order. Part IV sets forth policy recommendations-suggesting
that the FCC should not concede jurisdiction, but rather aggressively
pursue it. It also suggests that, if need be, Congress should step in and grant
the FCC explicit authority to regulate the network management practices of
cable Internet providers. Part IV also argues that the FCC, once it secures
jurisdiction, should take the next step forward by codifying the framework
that it set forth in its FCC Order but backed by monitoring procedures and
real consequences, such as a form of probationary period. Finally, Part V
concludes that while jurisdiction may be the issue of the day, the D.C.
Circuit's decision does not foreclose the possibility that the FCC will
reenter the picture in the near future. As Comcast's actions-its prior
employment of discriminatory management practices and failure to comply
with the FCC Order (when it was assumed valid)-illustrate, future
regulation of network management practices must be accomplished by
more than just adjudicative proceedings based on vague principles. Clear
rules backed by monitoring procedures and serious consequences must be
adopted and enforced.
II. BACKGROUND-NETWORK MANAGEMENT
The following Sections discuss network management as a concept,
why regulations are needed, and the initial steps taken by Congress and the
FCC to regulate such practices. The Sections that follow then focus on the
network management practices of one of the world's largest ISPs, Comcast
Corporation, that led the FCC to pursue aggressive regulatory tactics. Part
II.C outlines exactly how Comcast's former management practices worked.
Part II.D discusses the FCC Order and the framework it employed in
determining that Comcast's practices had violated federal Internet policies.
Part II.E mentions Comcast's response to the FCC Order-the adoption of
new network management practices and, in the alternative, an appeal to the
D.C. Circuit challenging the FCC's authority to regulate its practices in the
first place. Part II.F discusses the D.C. Circuit's long-anticipated decision,
which focused on the FCC's authority to regulate in this area. Finally, Part
II.G outlines the reactions by the FCC and Comcast to the D.C. Circuit's
decision in an effort to anticipate the future direction of this dispute.
A. Understanding Network Management
Most users access the Internet by paying monthly access fees to an
ISP. ISPs then grant customers access to their high-speed Internet service.
Most high-speed Internet services consist of a shared network, meaning
that customers "share upstream and downstream bandwidth with their
[Vol. 62
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neighbors.' 2 Comcast's Internet service is structured in this way. The
shared nature of these networks makes them vulnerable to congestion
during periods of peak demand; the network's capacity is limited. 3
Because different Internet activities require varying amounts of bandwidth,
congestion can also occur during off-peak times if customers place
"disproportionate demands on network resources" by engaging in activities
that require large amounts of bandwidth.' 4 When congestion occurs, the
Internet experience for all subscribers connected to the same "Optical
Node" is degraded.1
5
In an age when demand for high-speed Internet service is growing at
an exponential rate,' 6 ISPs are constantly exploring cost-effective ways to
minimize congestion and accommodate increasing demand on existing
networks. One of the primary ways that ISPs address these issues is by
"managing" Internet traffic. 7 As a result, most ISPs employ some form of
network management practice. These practices are designed to avoid
effects of network congestion by scaling back the bandwidth of certain
users when overall network demand is high. This highly technical practice
is most easily explained by analogy to highway traffic. Network congestion
occurs when four or more cars attempt to drive side by side on a three-lane
highway. Instead of slowing down all four cars, ISPs seek to design
network management practices that slow down only one car-usually the
largest car-so that the three other cars can continue uninterrupted,
ensuring that no more than three cars are driving side by side at any given
time. This practice is commonly referred to as "throttling traffic."18
Sticking with the analogy, Comcast designed its former network
management practices to target and throttle specific larger cars-makes and
models that Comcast determined were particularly culpable in causing
network traffic problems. It turns out that Comcast went so far as to slow
targeted cars even when there were no other cars on the road.' 9 As this
12. Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Comcast
Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, Attachment A (Sept. 19, 2008), available at
http://downloads.comcast.net/docs/AttachmentACurrentPractices.pdf [hereinafter
Comcast's Former Practices].
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Each of Comcast subscribers' cable modems are linked to an Optical Node.
Multiple Optical Nodes are connected to Cable Modem Termination Systems (CMTSes) or
"data nodes." Multiple CMTSes share a connection to high-level routers which are finally
connected to Comcast's "Internet backbone facilities." Id. at 2.
16. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 1.
17. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 47. Because most ISP networks are unique,
management techniques vary from provider to provider. Id. at para. 31.
18. See e.g., id. at para. 6.
19. See infra Part II.C.1.
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discussion illustrates, such practices can implicate important social policies
that have encouraged both Congress and the FCC to take measures to
prevent the open and competitive nature of the Internet.
B. Precursors to the Regulation of Network Management Practices
Section 230(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 sets forth
Congress's national Internet policy.20 That section states that it is the policy
of the United States "to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet" and "to promote the continued
development of the Intemet."2 Congress enacted these policies in
recognition of the fact that the Internet "represent[s] an extraordinary
advance in the availability of educational and informational resources" and
is "a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities
for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity. ' 2
Citing these congressional policies, and claiming authority under Section
706(a) of the Communications Act of 1934,23 the FCC took its first step
toward regulating the Internet in 2005 when it issued its Internet Policy
Statement.24 In that statement, the FCC adopted the following four Internet
principles:
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet,
[1] Consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their
choice.
[2] Consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their
choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement.
[3] Consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that
do not harm the network.
[4] Consumers are entitled to competition among network providers,
application and service providers, and content providers.25
The FCC qualified these principles, however, stating that the purpose of its
Internet Policy Statement was not to adopt rules and that each principle was
subject to "reasonable network management., 26
Shortly after adopting these principles, the FCC clarified its new
20. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facil's, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, para. 4 (2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy
Statement].
21. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2) (2006).
22. Id. § 230(a).
23. In its Internet Policy Statement, the FCC bases its authority on Section 706(a),
stating that it "charges the Commission with 'encourag[ing] the deployment on a reasonable
and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability'-broadband-'to all
Americans."' Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, at para 2.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at para. 5 n.15.
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position regarding the Internet, warning that "[i]f in the future evidence
arises that any company is willfully blocking or degrading Internet content,
affected parties may file a complaint with the Commission. ''27 It was
statements such as these that likely led to increased scrutiny over the ways
in which ISPs regulated their networks. It was not long after the adoption
of these principles that the FCC followed through on its promise.
C. The FCC Condemns Comcast's Network Management Practices
Shortly after the FCC adopted its Internet Policy Statement, questions
arose as to how Comcast was regulating its bandwidth. When the true
nature of its network management practices finally surfaced, Comcast
found itself facing significant political and legal challenges.28 On
November 1, 2007, Free Press, an Internet watchdog, filed a complaint
against Comcast, requesting that the FCC declare "that an Internet service
provider violates the [Commission's] Internet Policy Statement when it
intentionally degrades a targeted Internet application., 29 Free Press also
filed a petition" for a declaratory ruling requesting that the FCC "clarify
that an [ISP] violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement when it
intentionally degrades a targeted Internet application.' Another watchdog,
Vuze, filed a petition of its own, requesting that the FCC "adopt reasonable
rules that would prevent the network operators from engaging in practices
that discriminate against particular Internet applications, content or
technologies. 32 More than 20,000 Americans supported Free Press's and
Vuze's demands for redress against Comcast by themselves requesting that
the FCC take immediate action against "Comcast's blatant and deceptive
blocking of peer-to-peer [P2P] communications. 33
1. Comcast's Former Network Management Practices
At the time Free Press filed its complaint, Comcast's network
management practices addressed the disproportionate burden placed on its
network by targeting certain high-bandwidth applications-particularly
27. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 35 (quoting Applications for Consent to the
Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21
F.C.C.R. 8203, para. 220 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. See Saul Hansell, F.C.C. Chief Would Bar Comcast from Imposing Web
Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2008, at Cl, C5, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/technology/12comcast.html.
29. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 10 (emphasis added).
30. See Petition of Free Press et al., Petition for Declaratory Ruling, WC Dkt. No. 07-
52 (filed Nov. 1, 2007), available at www.freepress.net/files/fp_et alnn declaratory_
ruling.pdf.
31. Id. at i (emphasis added).
32. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at para. 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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P2P protocols. Comcast stated that it adopted such an approach because "in
[its] experience... , the primary cause of congestion ... has been the high-
volume consumption of bandwidth associated [with such protocols]. ' '3
When Comcast determined that certain applications overly burdened its
network, it added that software to a list of managed protocols.35 As of 1997,
Comcast had designated five P2P protocols for management: Ares,
BitTorrent, eDonkey, FastTrack, and Gnutella.3 s
To manage these protocols, Comcast claimed that it established
"thresholds" 37-the maximum number of unidirectional uploads it would
allow for each protocol in a geographic area.38 When the threshold for a
particular protocol was reached, Comcast's network management system
delayed and, in some cases, permanently blocked the initiation of new
uploads for that protocol until the number of uploads returned to normal
levels.39 Perhaps more controversial was the way that Comcast "delayed"
the upload sessions for protocols on its "list." In such circumstances, when
a Comcast customer's computer established a "TCP connection"40 with
another computer, in attempting a P2P upload, Comcast would issue a
"reset packet" or "RST packet,"4' which would effectively interrupt the
upload, sometimes permanently.42 Because most P2P applications require a
reliable and continuous connection, RST packets are most commonly sent
by and between computers involved in a TCP connection when the
34. Comcast's Former Practices, supra note 12, at 1.
35. Id. at 8.
36. Id. Interestingly, each of these applications competes with Comcast's video-on-
demand (VOD) service. See FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 5.
37. Comcast's Former Practices, supra note 12, at 4. "The thresholds for each protocol
[varied] depending upon a number of factors . .. , including how the particular protocol
operates and the burden that the particular protocol was determined to place on [Comcast's]
upstream bandwidth." Id.
38. Id,
39. Id.
40. "TCP" refers to the Transmission Control Protocol, a type of connection that is
usually established between the user's computer and a server or another person's computer
when "an Internet user opens a webpage, sends an email, or shares a document with a
colleague." FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 3. The success of the BitTorrent and other
P2P applications is dependent on continuous and reliable TCP connections. See id. at paras.
3-4.
41. Because certain applications using a TCP connection will only work properly if the
connection is uninterrupted, the computers involved in the connection are programmed to
monitor the quality of the connection. "If either computer detects that 'something seriously
wrong has happened within the network,' it sends a 'reset packet' or 'RST packet' to the
other, signaling that the current connection should be terminated and a new connection
established 'if reliable communication is to continue."' Id. at para. 3 (quoting Letter from
Jack Zinman, Gen. Attorney, AT&T Servs., Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC,
Attachment at 2 (Apr. 25, 2008)).
42. Id. at paras. 8-9.
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connection is unreliable and should be terminated.43 By falsifying these
RST packets, Comcast was tricking the computers involved in the TCP
connection into terminating the connection.44 Both Comcast customers and
their computers were falsely led to believe that the connection was
unreliable.45 Furthermore, because reset packets were issued by equipment
installed adjacent to Cable Modem Termination Systems (CMTSes), 46 this
network management practice affected customers across relatively large
geographical areas-large cities as opposed to small neighborhoods, for
example-which could have been avoided had the equipment been
installed next to the more common Optical Nodes.4 7
Adding to the discriminatory way that it managed its network,
Comcast, like most ISPs, 48 had opted not to disclose the nature of its
management practices.49 However, when customers began to experience
significant performance problems with Comcast broadband connections,
specifically when using certain P2P applications, questions arose as to how
Comcast was managing its Internet traffic.50 When first questioned about
its management methods, Comcast denied throttling any traffic,
maintaining that its "policy was to 'pro-actively contact' those customers
using what Comcast deemed to be excessive bandwidth 'via phone to work
with them and address the issue or help them select a more appropriate
commercial-grade Comcast product.""'5 Not satisfied with Comcast's
explanation, the Associated Press (AP) and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) conducted independent tests to investigate the
allegations52 and concluded that their suspicions were accurate-Comcast
was selectively targeting customers who used certain P2P protocols.
53
Then, when Comcast finally admitted that that it targeted these five
protocols, it insisted that it only did so when the network became
congested.54 However, around the same time, a Comcast official admitted
that its "P2P management is triggered... regardless of the level of overall
network traffic at that time, and regardless of the time of day."5 Therefore,
43. See id. at para. 3.
44. See id. at para. 8.
45. See id. at paras. 3, 8.
46. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
47. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 48 (finding that, by managing its network over a
wider geographic area, Comcast's technique was over-inclusive).
48. See Metz, supra note 2.
49. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 1.
50. Id. at para. 6.
51. Id.
52. Id. at paras. 7-8.
53. Id.
54. See Comcast's Former Practices, supra note 12, at 3-4.
55. Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Comcast
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Comcast was not managing congestion at all; it was singling out certain
protocols for disparate treatment. So, not only did Comcast fail to disclose
its practices, it made every effort to cover them up.
In what was perhaps the final blow to Comcast customers' trust-
following the publication of the AP's and EFF's test results--Comcast
admitted, contrary to its previous disclosures, that it did in fact target P2P
traffic. 6 However, Comcast insisted that it did so only when "upload
sessions . . . reach a pre-determined congestion threshold in a particular
neighborhood., 57 Ultimately, through a series of public concessions,
Comcast disclosed the nature of its true management method, confirming
that its previous statements had not been entirely forthcoming.
58
2. The FCC's Analysis of Comcast's Practices
The threshold question in the FCC's analysis was whether Comcast's
network management practices implicated the federal Internet principles5 9
that it had adopted in its Internet Policy Statement.60 Ultimately, the FCC
concluded that Comcast's network management practices were
"discriminatory and arbitrary" and "unduly squelche[d] the dynamic
benefits of an open and accessible Internet.",6 1 Comcast's practices
implicated three of the FCC's four principles. Specifically, Comcast's
practices (1) limited consumers' ability "to access the lawful Internet
content of their choice" (the first principle); (2) impeded consumers from
Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC 5 (July 10, 2008) (emphasis added) (quoted in
FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 9).
56. Id. at para. 9.
57. See Comments of Comcast Corp., Broadband Industry Practices, FCC WC Docket
No. 07-52, 27 (rel. Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/
document/view?id=6519840991.
58. Id.
59. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 43.
Recognizing the Internet's dynamic potential, Congress set forth the federal
policies of "promot[ing] the continued development of the Internet" and of
"encourag[ing] the development of technologies [that] maximize user control over
what information is received by individuals ... who use the Internet" as part of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Id. at para. 12 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006)). To enforce these policies, Congress has
deferred to the FCC. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, at para. 2. In 2005, the
Supreme Court confirmed the FCC's jurisdiction and unrestricted ability "to impose
additional regulatory obligations" on ISPs. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Serv's, 545 U.S. 967, 976 (2005) ("the [FCC] has jurisdiction to impose additional
regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign
communications, see §§ 151-161"). With an apparent endorsement from Congress and the
Supreme Court in hand, the FCC pledged that it would regulate the Internet. Internet Policy
Statement, supra note 20, at para. 4.
60. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20.
6 1. FCC Order, supra note 5, at par. 1.
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running "applications of their choice," but not those favored by Comcast
(the second principle); and (3) discouraged the "development of
technologies" by impeding consumers from "run[ning] applications.., of
their choice" (the fourth principle).62
Despite these findings, Comcast maintained that its network
management practices did not violate federal Internet policy because they
constituted "reasonable network management." 63  To establish
reasonableness, the FCC required that Comcast's "justification for its
practice[s] ...clear a high threshold," namely, that Comcast's practice
"should further a critically important interest and be narrowly or carefully
tailored to serve that interest.'6 4 The result was not good for Comcast. The
FCC determined that Comcast's practices were both over- and under-
inclusive. 65 Its practices were over-inclusive because (1) they affected
customers using little bandwidth "simply because they [were] using a
disfavored application," (2) they were employed regardless of congestion
levels at the time, and (3) Comcast deployed its management equipment a
few steps further upstream than was possible--exposing more customers to
throttling than was necessary.66 Conversely, Comcast's practices were
under-inclusive because a "customer [could] use an extraordinary amount
of bandwidth during periods of network congestion," free from network
management, "so long as he [did] not utilize a disfavored application. 67
Furthermore, the FCC concluded that Comcast's practices were
presumptively unreasonable because Comcast had failed to disclose its
practices.68 The FCC then set forth a requirement that customer disclosure
be made "in a manner that customers of ordinary intelligence would
reasonably understand.'6 9 This additional requirement, the FCC argued,
would "enhance the 'vibrant and competitive free market .. .for the
Internet and interactive computer services' by allowing consumers to
compare and contrast competing providers' practices."70
62. Id. at para. 43 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at para. 45.
64. Id. at para. 47. The FCC did not decide whether "easing network congestion" is a
critically important interest. Id. at 48.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at para. 53 (stating that "[a] hallmark of whether something is reasonable is
whether a provider is willing to disclose to its customers what it is doing"). Despite this
statement, the FCC refrained from adopting "general disclosure requirements for the
network management practices of providers of broadband Internet access services." Id. at
para. 52.
69. Id.
70. Id. at para. 52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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3. Post-Order Fallout for Comcast and Other ISPs
Concluding that Comcast's network management practices ran afoul
of its Internet principles, the FCC required that Comcast
(1) disclose to the Commission the precise contours of the network
management practices at issue here, including what equipment has
been utilized, when it began to be employed, when and under what
circumstances it has been used, how it has been configured, what
protocols have been affected, and where it has been deployed;
(2) submit a compliance plan to the Commission with interim
benchmarks that describes how it intends to transition from
discriminatory to nondiscriminatory network management practices by
the end of the year; and
(3) disclose to the Commission and the public the details of the
network management practices that it intends to deploy following the
termination of its current practices, including the thresholds that will
trigger any limits on customers' access to bandwidth.7'
The FCC gave Comcast thirty days to comply with these disclosure
72requirements. Pursuant to the compliance requirements set forth by the
FCC in its Order, Comcast adopted a new network management practice
that, on its face, appeared far less objectionable than its former practices. 73
This was great news for consumers who value the open and
competitive nature of the Internet-characteristics that have enabled the
Internet to become a vital tool and valuable resource in the daily lives of
hundreds of millions of people around the globe. On the other hand, the
FCC Order represented a major change of scenery for many of the United
States' largest ISPs, who found themselves in uncharted waters.
D. Comcast's Response to the FCC Order
Despite filing an appeal with the D.C. Circuit challenging the FCC's
authority to enforce its network neutrality rules,74 Comcast assured the
FCC that it would nonetheless comply with the Order by deploying a new
network management plan built around a protocol-agnostic approach that
"does not manage congestion based on the protocol or application a
consumer uses," an excessive usage threshold, and full consumer
disclosure.75 On August 28, 2008, Comcast disclosed that it would be
71. Id. at para. 54.
72. Id. at para. 55.
73. See infra Part III.B.
74. See e.g., Posting of Sam Gustin to Daily Finance, http://www.dailyfinance.com/
2009/10/05/comcast-suit-over-fccs-net-neutrality-smackdown-heats-up/ (Oct. 5, 2009, 21:30
EST).
75. Lynn Stanton, Comcast Reveals Thresholds for Triggering 'Protocol-Agnostic'
Traffic Management Approach, TELECOMM. REP., Oct. 1, 2008, at 47.
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implementing a monthly 250 gigabyte (GB) "bandwidth threshold., 76 On
September 19, 2008, Comcast submitted to the FCC a detailed description
of its then-discriminatory network management practices7 7 and its
forthcoming "protocol-agnostic" approach. 78 Then, in a January 5, 2009,
letter to the FCC, Comcast confirmed that it had fully implemented its new
protocol-agnostic network management practice in compliance with the
FCC Order.79
E. The D.C. Circuit Vacates the FCC Order
Over two years after Comcast had fully implemented its new network
management practices, in a decision dated April 6, 2010, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the FCC Order.80 This was a major
setback for the FCC in its efforts to regulate the Internet. In its decision, the
D.C. Circuit addressed neither the framework that the FCC employed in its
Order nor the outcome. Rather, it narrowly addressed whether the FCC
"ha[d] [statutory] authority to regulate [Comcast's] network management
,,81practices.
To determine whether the FCC's foray into Internet regulation was
lawful, the court addressed whether Congress had, in fact, provided the
FCC with the requisite authority. 82 Recognizing that the FCC has "no
express statutory authority" to regulate ISP network management
practices-a conclusion that the FCC itself implicitly acknowledged by not
arguing it on appeal,83 the D.C. Circuit focused its attention on whether the
FCC had "ancillary authority" pursuant to Section 4(i) of the
Communications Act of 1934. 84 That Section "authorizes the Commission
to 'perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue
such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the
76. Comcast.net Terms of Service, Announcement Regarding an Amendment to Our
Acceptable Use Policy, http://www.comcast. net/terms/network/amendment/ (last visited
Apr. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Comcast's Acceptable Use Policy].
77. Comcast's Former Practices, supra note 12.
78. Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Comcast
Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, Attachment B (Sept. 19, 2008), available at
http://downloads.comcast.net/docs/AttachmentBFuture.Practices.pdf [hereinafter
Comcast's New Practices].
79. See Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Comcast
Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC (Jan. 5, 2009), available at
http://downloads.comeast.net/docs/comcast-nm-transition-notification.pdf.
80. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2010).
81. Id. slip op. at 2.
82. Id.
83. See id. slip op. at 1.
84. Id. slip op. at 3.
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execution of its finctions."' 85 As the D.C. Circuit held in an earlier case,
the FCC "may exercise this 'ancillary' authority only if it demonstrates that
its action ... is 'reasonably ancillary to the ... effective performance of its
statutorily mandated responsibilities.' '8 6 Pursuant to the Communications
Act, these "statutorily mandated responsibilities" include the following:
"express and expansive authority to regulate [1] common carrier services,
including landline telephony," under Title II, [2] "radio transmissions,
including broadcast television, radio, and cellular telephony," under Title
III, and [3] "cable services, including cable television," under Title VI.8
7
The D.C. Circuit employed the two-part test that it had adopted in
American Library Association v. FCC38 to determine whether the FCC had
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate Comcast's network management
practices. 89 Under that test, "[t]he Commission . . . may exercise ancillary
jurisdiction only when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the Commission's
general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the Communications Act]
covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary
to the Commission's effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities. ' 9° Because Comcast had conceded the first element, the
second element became the dispositive issue.9'
85. Id. slip op. at 2-3 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006)).
86. Id. slip op. at 3 (citing Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir.
2005)).
87. Id. slip op. at 5 (internal citations omitted).
88. 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
89. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-129 1, slip op. at 7 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2010).
90. Id. slip op. at 7 (citing American Library Ass'n, 406 F.3d at 691-92) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
91. Id, slip op. at 8. The FCC advanced two threshold arguments in addition to
numerous other arguments. See generally id. It first argued that Comcast should be estopped
from challenging the FCC's jurisdiction over its network management practices because
Comcast had taken a contrary position in a California lawsuit. Id. The court dismissed this
argument, finding that Comcast's California argument was not "clearly inconsistent" with
the argument it presented on appeal. Id. slip op. at 8-12. The second threshold argument was
that "the Supreme Court's decision in BrandX 'already decided the jurisdictional question'
presented in Comcast's appeal. Id. slip op. at 12 (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 978 (2005)). In Brand X, the Court reviewed an FCC
Declaratory Ruling "which removed cable Internet service from Title II and Title VI
oversight by classifying it as an "information service." Id slip op. at 12. When reviewing
the challenge to the FCC's action, the Supreme Court ultimately held that, although cable
Internet service does contain a telecommunications component, "the Commission remains
free to impose special regulatory duties on [cable Internet providers] under its Title I
ancillary jurisdiction." Id. slip op. at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). These
determinations placed cable Internet providers under Title I jurisdiction. Id. The D.C.
Circuit held that Brand X had not abandoned the "fundamental approach to ancillary
authority set forth in [prior case law]." Id slip op. at 16. Refusing to deviate from this case
law, the D.C. Circuit insisted that the FCC's jurisdiction over Comcast's network
management practices must be "independently justified as reasonably ancillary" to the
FCC's express jurisdiction under Title I of the Act. Id. slip op. at 15 (emphasis omitted).
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In support of its claim that the second element was satisfied, the FCC
cited a number of provisions within the Communications Act.92 The first
category of provisions consisted of, as Comcast labeled them, "statements
of policy. '93 Comcast argued that because such policy statements "are not
an operative part of the statute, and do not enlarge or confer powers on
administrative agencies. . . .[they] fail to set forth statutorily mandated
responsibilities." 94 The D.C. Circuit agreed, noting that "[a]lthough policy
statements may illuminate [ancillary] authority, it is Title II, III, or VI to
which the authority must ultimately be ancillary." 95 Ultimately, the D.C.
Circuit found "'no relationship whatever' . . . between the Order and
services subject to Commission regulation. 96
Unlike the first category, the second category of provisions, upon
which the FCC relied in defending the appeal, "could at least arguably be
read to delegate regulatory authority to the Commission. 97 The first is
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.98 That Section
provides that the Commission "shall encourage the deployment on a
reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to
all Americans . . . by utilizing . . . price cap regulation, regulatory
forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove
barriers to infrastructure investment." 99 Although this Section provides a
direct mandate, the D.C. Circuit determined that the FCC was bound by "an
earlier, still-binding order, [in which] the Commission ruled that section
706 'does not constitute an independent grant of authority.""100 In fact, the
court knocked down every other section of the Communications Act-
92. Id. slip op. at 17.
93. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. slip op. at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. slip op. at 22. It is this language, specifically, which injects some irony into the
situation. In fact, it is the FCC that is responsible for the 2002 Order which removed cable
Internet providers from Title II and VI jurisdiction. See supra note 84.
96. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291, slip op. at 23 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2010)
(internal citations omitted).
97. Id. slip op. at 30.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing In re Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms.
Capability, Order on Reconsideration, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,012, para 77 (1998)).
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
Sections 256,101 257,102 201,103 and 623'0° -to which the FCC attempted to
tie its ancillary authority to regulate network management practices.'0 5
Finding that the FCC had "failed to tie its assertion of ancillary
authority over Comcast's Internet service to any statutorily mandated
responsibility," the D.C. Circuit vacated the FCC Order.'°6
F. Comcast and the FCC Respond to the D.C. Circuit Decision
The D.C. Circuit's decision, which had been pending for over a year,
garnered significant and widespread response from the parties involved-
both Comcast and the FCC issued press releases addressing the opinion.
Comcast issued the following statement:
We are gratified by the Court's decision today to vacate the previous
FCC's order. Our primary goal was always to clear our name and
reputation. We have always been focused on serving our customers
101. Section 256 directs the FCC to "establish procedures for . . . oversight of
coordinated network planning... for the effective and efficient interconnection of public
telecommunications networks." 47 U.S.C. § 256(b)(1) (2006). The D.C. Circuit deflected
this argument by pointing to additional language in that section, which states that "[n]othing
in this section shall be construed as expanding . . . any authority that the commission
[otherwise has under law]." Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291, slip op. at 32 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 6, 2010) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 256(c) (2006)).
102. Section 257 gave the FCC fifteen months to "complete a proceeding for the purpose
of identifying and eliminating, by regulations pursuant to its authority under this chapter
(other than this section), market entry barriers for entrepreneurs and other small businesses
in the provision and ownership of telecommunications services and information services."
47 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2006). While the FCC has completed this proceeding, the FCC is still
required "to report to Congress every three years on any remaining barriers." Comcast
Corp., No. 08-1291, slip op. at 32. The D.C. Circuit disagreed, stating that "the
Commission's attempt to dictate the operation of an otherwise unregulated service based on
nothing more than its obligation to issue a report defies any plausible notion of
'ancillariness."' Id. slip op. at 33.
103. Section 201 provides that "[a]ll charges, practices, classifications, and regulations
for and in connection with [common carrier] service shall be just and reasonable." 47 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (2006). The FCC cited this Section in support of its jurisdiction in the original FCC
Order. It claimed that "by blocking certain traffic on Comcast's Internet service, the
company had effectively shifted the burden of that traffic to other service providers,"
thereby increasing their variable costs. Comcast Corp, No. 08-1291, slip op. at 33 (citing
FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 17). The FCC claimed jurisdiction on the basis that some
of those providers were "operating their Internet access services on a common carrier basis
subject to Title II." Id. slip op. at 32 (citing FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 17). However,
on appeal, the FCC presented its section 201 argument under the guise of Voice-over-
Internet Protocol (VoIP) services. Id. slip op. at 34. The D.C. Circuit refused to consider the
merits of either argument because it found that the FCC (1) had waived the first argument
by not presenting it on appeal and (2) could not rely upon the second argument because it
"must defend its action on the same grounds advanced in the Order." Id. slip op. at 33-34.
104. For an in-depth discussion of Section 623's applicability in this context, see
Comcast Corp., No. 08-1291, slip op. at 34-35.
105. See id. slip op. at 30-35.
106. Id. slip op. at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and delivering the quality open-Intemet experience consumers want.
Comcast remains committed to the FCC's existing open Internet
principles, and we will continue to work constructively with this FCC
as it determines how best to increase broadband adoption and preserve
an open and vibrant Internet.'
0 7
Whether Comcast will continue to adhere to its post-FCC Order network
management practices (i.e., current practices) is unclear. However,
Comcast's commitment to those practices is somewhat misleading because,
as Part III of this Note argues, Comcast was never actually in compliance
with the FCC Order.'
0 8
The same day, the FCC also responded by issuing a number of press
releases. The statement issued on behalf of the entire FCC stated, among
other things, that
[t]he FCC is firmly committed to promoting an open Internet and to
policies that will bring the enormous benefits of broadband to all
Americans. It will rest these policies--all of which will be designed to
foster innovation and investment while protecting and empowering
consumers--on a solid legal foundation. °9
It also acknowledged that the D.C. Circuit's decision did not "close the
door to other methods for achieving" an open Internet.' 10 A statement
issued by Commissioner Michael Copps provided a more detailed response
and suggested possible FCC responses to the D.C. Circuit's opinion:
Since 2002, I have warned about the dangers of moving the
transmission component of broadband outside of the statutory
framework that applies to telecommunications carriers. The only way
the Commission can make lemonade out of this lemon of a decision is
to do now what should have been done years ago: treat broadband as
the telecommunications service that it is....
It is time that we stop doing the "ancillary authority" dance and
instead rely on the statute Congress gave us to stand on solid legal
ground in safeguarding the benefits of the Internet for American
consumers. We should straighten this broadband classification mess
out before the first day of summer." 'I
Commissioner Clyburn added that the decision gives the FCC "the kind of
guidance that will enable [it] to develop the most effective and legally
107. Press Release, Comcast, Comcast Statement on U.S. Court of Appeals Decision on
Comcast v. FCC, Apr. 6, 2010, available at http://www.comcast.com/About/PressRelease/
PressReleaseDetail.ashx?PR1JD=984 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. See supra Part III.B
109. Press Release, FCC, FCC Statement on Comcast v. FCC Decision, Apr. 6, 2010,
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297355AI.pdf.
110. Id.
111. Press Release, FCC, Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps on the Comcast
v. FCC Decision, Apr. 6, 2010, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/DOC-297368Al.pdf [hereinafter Statement of Commissioner Copps].
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sound rules of the road to preserve Internet openness .... ,1 2
What is apparent from these statements is the FCC's commitment to
preserving and advancing the openness of the Internet. How it continues to
pursue this goal-and how, if at all, it plans to regulate network
management practices in the future-is unclear." 3 However, if the
statements by Commissioners Copps and Clyburn are any indication, the
battle is not over yet. Nor should it be.
III. WHAT NEXT? JURISDICTION AND BEYOND
Following the D.C. Circuit's decision, speculation about how the FCC
would rebound from this setback began to spread." 14 Part III.A explores the
various routes that the FCC could take to "reestablish" jurisdiction over
network management practices. However, while the FCC must focus on
jurisdiction, it is only the first step that the FCC must take to get back on
track. As Comcast's failure to comply with the requirements set forth in the
FCC Order demonstrate, the second step is designing, implementing, and
enforcing Internet regulation that will require strict compliance with
Internet principles. To emphasize this second point, Part III.B discusses the
lingering network management regulation problems that the FCC must
face, even after the jurisdictional issue is resolved.
A. Securing Jurisdiction over Network Management Practices
There are a variety of ways that the FCC can "reestablish" jurisdiction
over cable Internet providers such as Comcast. Perhaps the most obvious
option procedurally would be to appeal to the Supreme Court. There are a
number of reasons to believe that this option would prove unsuccessful,
however. First, the FCC has given no clear indication of its plan to appeal
the D.C. Circuit's decision. Even if it had (or does in the future), and the
Supreme Court actually grants certiorari (which is also not a given), it is
hard to envision a different outcome. Notably, the D.C. Circuit's
unanimous decision was written by Judge David S. Tatel, one of the court's
more liberal members." 5 On that basis alone, it is hard to believe that the
right-leaning Supreme Court would come to a different conclusion,
especially with respect to such a narrow decision.
Another potential source of jurisdiction is Congress itself. In fact, the
112. Press Release, FCC, Statement of Commissioner Mignon Clyburn Regarding the
D.C. Circuit's Decision in Comcast v. FCC, Apr. 6, 2010, available at
http'/hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297365AI.pdf.
113. Many of the possible courses of action will be discussed in Part IV.
114. See Edward Wyatt, US. Court Curbs F.C.C. Authority on Web Traffic, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 6, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.conV/2010/04/07/technology/07net.html.
115. Id.
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D.C. Circuit's decision may have been exactly what the FCC needed in
order to get Congress to delegate explicit authority to the FCC to regulate
network management practices.' 16
A third option, implied in the D.C. Circuit's decision 17 and alluded to
by Commissioner Copps, 1 8 would be to reclassify" 9 broadband service so
that it falls within the explicit regulatory authority afforded the FCC under
Titles II and VI of the Communications Act. 20 This option is perhaps the
most realistic because it requires the least amount of cooperation from
outside entities (Congress or the Supreme Court). As the Supreme Court
noted in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services, there is a "presumption that Congress, when it left
ambiguity in a statute for implementation by an agency, understood that the
ambiguity would be resolved first and foremost, by the agency, and desired
the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion
the ambiguity allows.'' In Brand X, the Court was asked to determine
whether the FCC's resolution of a statutory ambiguity-the definition of
"telecommunications service"--that it set forth in its 2002 Declaratory
Ruling was a permissible reading of the Communications Act. 22 Under the
two-part framework established in Chevron, the Court first asked "whether
the statute's plain terms 'directly addres[s] the precise question at
issue."",123 Then, "[i]f the statute is ambiguous on the point, [the Court]
defer[s] at step two to the agency's interpretation so long as the
construction is 'a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make."",124 The
Court concluded that the FCC's interpretation was permissible at both
steps. 25 It also noted that "the Commission is free within the limits of
reasoned interpretation to change course if it adequately justifies the
116. See id. (noting that this could "prove difficult politically . . . since some
conservative Republicans philosophically oppose giving the agency more power, on the
grounds that Internet providers should be able to decide what services they offer and at what
price").
117. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291, slip op. at 12-13 (D.C. Cir. April 6, 2010).
118. See Statement of Commissioner Copps, supra note 111.
119. In fact, the FCC single-handedly removed broadband service from the ambit of its
explicit regulatory authority when it classified cable modem service as an "information
service," rather than a "telecommunications service" under the Communications Act. See In
re High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facil's, Declaratory Ruling and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, at para. 7 (2002), aff'd, Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
120. See, e.g., Wyatt, supra note 114.
121. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 982.
122. Id. at986-87.
123. Id. at 987 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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change.'26 Therefore, in order to reclassify cable Internet service so that it
falls within the FCC's explicit authority under the Communications Act,
the FCC will have to provide adequate justification for the change. Pointing
to the discriminatory way in which Comcast managed its network and the
impact that such behavior has had on the competitive and open nature of
the Internet, as well as other ISPs, may provide such justification.
As this Section illustrates, there are a variety of possible alternatives
the FCC could pursue to secure jurisdiction in this area. Only time will tell
which, if any, will succeed.
B. Lingering Hurdles to an Open Internet-How the FCC Order
Failed
Even if the FCC manages to finagle jurisdiction through one of the
methods discussed in Part III.A, its ability to effectively regulate network
management practices will still be in question. This becomes especially
apparent when evaluating Comcast's new network management practices
under the framework employed in the FCC Order, an analysis which this
Section undertakes.
1. Protocol-Agnostic Network Management
Under Comcast's fully deployed protocol-agnostic network
management practice, 127 all traffic to and from users' computers connected
to the Comcast high-speed Internet network is examined and then
designated either Priority Best Effort (PBE) or Best Effort (BE),128 with
PBE being the default status for Internet traffic. 129 A Comcast customer's
service will only be susceptible to degradation if that user's activity
warrants a designation of BE. 130 A customer's traffic will only be degraded
to BE if two situations occur.'3' First, the aggregate usage level of a
particular upstream or downstream port of a CMTS, measured over the past
fifteen minutes,132 must be near congestion. 33 Second, a subscriber must be
126. Id. at 1001 (emphasis added) (noting that the FCC's justification for classifying
cable modem services as an "information service"--that "broadband services should exist in
a minimal regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation in a competitive
market"--was adequate at the time).
127. For a more in-depth explanation of the hardware and software required by
Comcast's protocol-agnostic network management, see Comcast's New Practices, supra
note 78.
128. Id. at 6.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at6-7.
132. Id. at 9.
133. Id. at 6-7. This is referred to as the "Near Congestion State" and it occurs when
"traffic flowing to or from that CMTS port . . . exceed[s] a specified level (the 'Port
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making a "significant contribution to the bandwidth usage on the particular
port" that is approaching congestion, which Comcast calls the "Extended
High Consumption State.' 34 A subscriber must sustain consumption of
more than seventy percent 135 of his or her provisioned upstream or
downstream bandwidth for a period of fifteen minutes.136 Only when both
of the aforementioned conditions occur will a subscriber's upstream or
downstream traffic be designated as BE. 37 Once a subscriber's status has
been designated BE, "such traffic will not be delayed so long as the
network segment is not actually congested.' ' 38 Ultimately, however, when
congestion does occur, it will affect subscribers with BE status before those
with PBE status. 13 9 A subscriber's status will remain BE so long as his or
her bandwidth consumption rates continue to exceed the thresholds.' 4 A
subscriber's status will return to PBE once his or her consumption has
returned to levels below the thresholds for more than fifteen minutes. 4'
This is a complicated system to be sure. To clarify, Comcast provided
a simplified explanation in its FCC filings:
Simply put, there are four steps to determining whether the traffic
associated with a particular cable modem is designated as PBE or BE:
1. Determine if the CMTS port is in a Near Congestion State.
2. If yes, determine whether any users are in an Extended High
Consumption State.
3. If yes, change those users' traffic to BE from PBE. If the answer at
either step one or step two is no, no action is taken.
4. If a user's traffic has been designated BE, check user consumption
at next [15 minute] interval. If user consumption has declined below
predetermined threshold, reassign the user's traffic as PBE. If not,
recheck at next interval. 1
42
To implement its new practices, Comcast deployed new hardware and
Utilization Threshold')," which is "measured as a percentage of the total aggregate upstream
or downstream bandwidth for the particular port during [the past fifteen minutes]." Id. at 7.
Comcast set its upstream threshold at seventy percent and its downstream threshold at
eighty percent. Id. at 8. "Thus, over any 15-minute period, if an average of more than 70
percent of a port's upstream bandwidth capacity or more than 80 percent of a port's
downstream bandwidth capacity is utilized, that port will be determined to be in a Near
Congestion State." Id. Comcast has further reserved the right to adjust these threshold levels
as it deems necessary. Id. at 7.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Referred to as the "User Consumption Threshold." Id. at 9.
136. Id. The provisioned upstream or downstream bandwidth is determined by the level
of service a customer has purchased. Id.
137. Id. at 7.
138. Id. at2.
139. Id. at 7.
140. See id. at 10-11.
141. Id. at2.
142. Id. at 10-11.
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software adjacent to the Regional Network Routers (RNRs), which are
further upstream than its CMTSes. 143 Despite the upstream location of the
new hardware, Comcast claims that it uses the RNRs to manage network
congestion further downstream through the CMTSes, on a scope similar to
its previous network management
Comcast has appeared confident in its new practices, boasting that
"on average less than one-third of one percent of subscribers have had their
traffic priority status changed to the BE state on any given day.' 45 It has
further asserted that its protocol-agnostic network management practice
"has nothing to do with the applications a customer uses and everything to
do with the total bandwidth being used in the last few minutes,"' 46 and that
this new technique "ensure[s] that all customers get their fair share of
bandwidth every hour of the day.'
' 47
At first glance, Comcast's protocol-agnostic approach appears far less
discriminatory than its former practices. While the FCC's main complaint
with the ISP's former network management was its arbitrary and
discriminatory targeting of certain protocols, 148 the new approach does not
explicitly target any protocols or applications. 49 In fact, the new approach
appears to incorporate the FCC's suggestion that Comcast implement new
practices that "throttle back the connection speeds of high-capacity users
(rather than any user who relies on [P2P] technology)."' 50 In sum,
Comcast's new approach improves upon past practices in the following
ways: (1) it degrades user access only when congestion occurs; (2) it does
not explicitly target certain applications; (3) it does not involve fraudulent
practices, such as deceiving computers and users by sending falsified RST
packets; (4) it delays, rather than interrupts, consumer access; and (5) the
nature of the approach is fully disclosed and available for subscriber review
on Comcast's Web site.15'
Nevertheless, critics have remained skeptical. 52  This is
understandable in light of Comcast's predisposition for changing its story
143. Id. at 4.
144. As a result, "bandwidth usage on one CMTS port will have no effect on whether the
congestion management practices ... are applied to a subscriber on a different CMTS port."
Id. at 5.
145. Id. at 10.
146. Latest Comcast Traffic Shaping Techniques Similar to That of NetEqualizer
APconnections, Inc., BIOTECH WK., Oct. 8, 2008, at 3022, available at 2008 WLNR
18740638.
147. Stanton, supra note 75, at 47 (emphasis added).
148. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 1.
149. See generally Comcast's New Practices, supra note 78.
150. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 49.
151. See generally Comcast's New Practices, supra note 78.
152. See Stanton, supra note 75.
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as it relates to network management. 53 In fact, a closer look at Comcast's
protocol-agnostic practices reveals that this skepticism is well-founded.
Such an inspection reveals that Comcast's new practices fall short of
compliance with the FCC Order. The first step in this inquiry is to
determine whether the new practices violate one of the four Internet
principles.' 54 This is not difficult, as simply subjecting Internet access to
degradation likely implicates the first principle-entitling subscribers to
access the lawful Internet content of their choice.155 Upon such a showing,
Comcast would have to establish that its network management practices are
reasonable by demonstrating that they are "carefully tailored to its interest
in easing network congestion."
1 56
The new approach fails the reasonableness test in two distinct ways.
First, it is over-inclusive because it subjects subscribers to service
degradation even when that subscriber is not contributing to network
congestion on a particular CMTS port at that moment.'57 This results
because a subscriber's priority status is determined by the amount of
bandwidth that subscriber has used in the past fifteen minutes.' 58
Second-identical to its former practices--Comcast's new approach
manages congestion at the CMTS level. As a result, "Comcast's technique
may impact numerous nodes within its network simultaneously, regardless
of whether any particular node is experiencing congestion."' 59 Without
more information, it is hard to understand why Comcast cannot manage
congestion further downstream through its Optical Nodes, which the FCC
has explicitly stated would be more narrowly tailored to Comcast's interest
in easing network congestion. 60 The most likely reason for managing the
153. See supra Part II.C.1.
154. See supra Part II.C.2.
155. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
156. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 48.
157. See Stanton, supra note 75, at 47; Comcast's New Practices, supra note 78, at 8-11.
The following illustrates how such a scenario might occur: A logs onto the Internet and
engages in activity requiring large amounts of upstream bandwidth. Despite A's usage,
congestion does not result due to light traffic on the CMTS upstream port. However, after
fifteen minutes of extensive bandwidth use, A's status is degraded to BE for the next fifteen
minutes. Shortly after having his status degraded (unbeknownst to him), A incidentally cuts
back on his bandwidth demand, thereby reducing his consumption to levels below the
threshold. Despite reducing his bandwidth consumption, A's service is then subject to
management and slowed five minutes later, when the CMTS port becomes congested. It is
very likely, at this point, that other subscribers have begun using large amounts of
bandwidth, contributing to the congestion, but have not had their service statuses
downgraded to BE yet. This example illustrates why Comcast's new approach, while a
major improvement over its former practices, still falls short under the FCC's framework
with respect to its lack of "real time" management.
158. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
159. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 48.
160. Id.
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network further upstream is cost minimization. However, this argument
does not fully explain Comcast's choices because the management
equipment is located further upstream, adjacent to the RNRs, but manages
congestion through the CMTSes.' 61 If Comcast can manage downstream
traffic from an upstream location, why does it not use the same equipment
to manage the network through the Optical Nodes, as the FCC suggested?
This analysis demonstrates the ways in which Comcast's protocol-
agnostic network management practices fall short of compliance with the
FCC Order. To ensure full compliance in the future, the FCC needs to take
a more proactive monitoring approach similar to Ronald Reagan's "trust
but verify" philosophy, which the FCC indicated it would favor in its
Order.'
62
2. Excessive Use Threshold
In addition to deploying its new protocol-agnostic approach, Comcast
responded to the FCC Order by announcing that it was "amending" its
excessive use policy, effective October 1, 2008, by imposing a 250GB
monthly bandwidth usage threshold. 63 In response to complaints, Comcast
emphasized that such a threshold was not new. 64 In fact, it emphasized
that, as part of its ongoing "Acceptable Use Policy," it has "long had an
'excessive use' limit" and that the announcement of the adjusted cap
simply "provides clarity to customers" as required by the FCC in its August
Order.165 According to Comcast, its excessive use threshold is designed "to
prevent any one residential account from consuming excessive amounts [of
bandwidth]" in any given month. 66 Ultimately, any subscriber who
exceeds the threshold twice within six months is "subject to having his or
her Internet service account terminated for one year.'0
67
Not considered by the FCC in its Order, most likely because Comcast
did not disclose it until August 28, 2008, the usage threshold has also
generated skepticism. 168 Specifically, critics question the need for such a
threshold in light of Comcast's new protocol-agnostic approach to network
management. 69 In response, Comcast has insisted that the cap is
161. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
162. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 54.
163. Lynn Stanton & Ted Gotsch, Comcast Appeals FCC Order on Traffic Management;
MAP, Vuze Seek Faster End to P2P Throttling, TELECOMM. REP., Sept. 15, 2008, available
at 2008 WLNR 17230008.
164. See Comcast's New Practices, supra note 78, at 1 n.3.
165. Id. at 1 n.3.
166. Id. at 1-2 n.3.
167. Id. at 1 n.3.
168. See Stanton, supra note 75, at 46-47.
169. Id.
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"independent" of and "should not be confused with" its "congestion
management practices.' 70 In fact, in its September 19, 2008, compliance
letter to the FCC, Comcast limited its discussion of its excessive use
threshold to a footnote.1 7' In a somewhat academic attempt to distinguish
this threshold from the ambit of network congestion management, Comcast
stated that, while the threshold "provides clarity to customers regarding the
specific monthly consumption limit per account," it "does not address the
issue of network congestion, which results from traffic levels that vary
from minute to minute.' 72 Alternatively, Comcast emphasized that such
criticism is misplaced because the 250GB threshold is very high-so high,
in fact, that it will only affect a very small percentage of its customers.
1 73
The excessive use threshold is likely to implicate the second and
fourth Internet principles, which provide that consumers are entitled to "run
applications and use services of their choice" and "competition among
network providers, application and service providers, and content
providers," respectively. 
74
While Comcast asserts that its excessive use threshold is unrelated to
its network congestion management, this distinction distorts reality. 75 In
fact, the only cognizable differences between the threshold and its protocol-
agnostic practices are the unit of time by which Comcast measures
bandwidth consumption and Comcast's response to excessive consumption.
Ultimately, the threshold is likely to produce effects similar to Comcast's
[T]here are a number of questions raised to which we do not have the answers.
Why, for example, does Comcast need both its real-time network management
system and the 250 GB [gigabyte] monthly cap on consumer usage? Will
consumers end up paying more for less bandwidth to use? Is it fair to consumers
to punish them based on usage lower than the advertised speed? Is it a problem to
punish a consumer now for what transpired on the network 15 minutes ago, even
if a customer [is] not contributing to congestion at the moment? Will there be
anticompetitive aspects to limiting consumer use of video over the Internet, but
not on the Comcast cable network?
Id. at 48 (quoting Gigi Sohn, President and Cofounder, Public Knowledge).
170. Comcast's New Practices, supra note 78, at 1 n.3.
171. Id. at I n.3.
172. Id.
173. Comcast maintains that the threshold level is "sufficient to download 125 standard-
definition movies or upload 25,000 high-resolution digital photos" and "that median
residential usage is only 2 to 3 gigabits per month." Stanton & Gotsch, supra note 163.
174. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 20, at para. 4.
175. The FCC did not consider Comcast's former excessive use threshold because the
company had not publicly disclosed this policy at the time. The company also did not
disclose this policy in its description of its former network management practices, as
submitted to the FCC on September 19, 2008. See generally Comcast's Former Practices,
supra note 12. It is also unlikely that the FCC would take this distinction seriously. In fact,
the former FCC chairman indicated his interest in the specifics of Comcast's threshold as it
relates to its network management practices. FCC Order, supra note 5, app. at 13065-68
(Chairman Kevin J. Martin, statement).
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former practices, which degraded P2P protocols that Comcast had
determined were the primary cause of bandwidth congestion. 176 Ultimately,
the threshold (1) disfavors those applications that require large amounts of
bandwidth and those customers that access them the most and (2) provides
Comcast with an alternative method of limiting competition for its video-
on-demand service-a violation of the FCC's fourth Internet principle.
Comcast countered by arguing that (1) it has always had a threshold
(we just did not know about it), and (2) the threshold is so high that it is
unlikely to affect any of its customers. 177 Even if these assertions are true,
as applications become more complicated-requiring larger amounts of
bandwidth-it is not difficult to envision how this threshold could easily
inhibit the technological development of new protocols and applications,
especially if Comcast does not habitually readjust the threshold. Comcast
itself has undermined its very need for such a threshold-indicating that the
threshold is so high, in fact, that very few, if any, subscribers will be
affected by it. Furthermore, the merits of this argument are limited by the
fact that, as new applications require increasing amounts of bandwidth,
more and more subscribers will be affected by the threshold.
Comcast's plans to terminate a subscriber's service for a year, if that
subscriber exceeds the threshold twice within six months, should also be
addressed through regulation. 178 In fact, it is hard to see how terminating a
customer's Internet service entirely does not implicate the FCC's Internet
principles. If Comcast is concerned with excessive bandwidth usage, it
should take the FCC's advice and charge those customers who exceed the
threshold.179 Regardless, to avoid new issues, the FCC clearly needs to
implement a monitoring system to continuously evaluate changing
practices as well as those that are downplayed by ISPs.
3. Consumer Disclosure
The FCC Order required Comcast to disclose to the FCC and to the
public the details of its network management practices, "including the
thresholds that will trigger any limits on customers' access to
bandwidth.' 180 In addition to fulfilling its disclosure obligations to the
FCC, Comcast has also made efforts to communicate with customers about
the specifics of its network management practices. 181 Specifically, it
176. Id. atpara. 1.
177. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
178. Comcast's New Practices, supra note 78, at 2 n.3.
179. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 49. In fact, in its Opinion and Order, the FCC
suggested that Comcast "cap the average users' capacity and then charge the most
aggressive users overage fees." Id.
180. Id. at para. 54.
181. Comcast.net, Comcast Network Management, http://networkmanagement.
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provides (1) an explanation on its Web site relating to its protocol-agnostic
management practices;' 82 (2) information on its Web site relating to the
250GB monthly bandwidth threshold; 183 and downloadable copies of the
FCC Order and its correspondence with the FCC, including a highly
technical description of both its former and current network management
practices.'84 The Web site also features network management updates and a
page devoted entirely to frequently asked questions.1
8 5
Comcast's about face with regards to disclosure of its network
management practices was smart thinking for two reasons: (1) disclosing
network management practices is easy and cheap; and (2) under the
framework of the FCC Order, Comcast's practices are no longer
presumptively unreasonable on the basis of disclosure.
186
Despite the availability of this information, these disclosures are
hardly made "in a manner that customers of ordinary intelligence would
reasonably understand."18 7 While the portions of Comcast's Web site
dedicated to discussing its protocol-agnostic approach are set forth in
simple terms, they are lacking in detail. 8 8 For example, the company
indicates that its "new congestion management technique will only ever
impact a tiny fraction [(less than one percent)] of [its] customers who
consume extraordinary amounts of bandwidth.''189 Does this mean that the
technique will affect only a small fraction of all customers or only a small
fraction of those customers who use an "extraordinary" amount of
bandwidth? How much is an extraordinary amount of bandwidth? How
long must a customer exceed the threshold of extraordinary bandwidth
usage before he or she is subject to degradation? Once a customer has
attained this status, how long will Comcast manage his or her bandwidth?
A quick glance at Comcast's Network Management Web site does not
produce quick answers to these questions.
comcast.net/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Comcast's Network Management
Disclosures].
182. See id.
183. See Comcast's Acceptable Use Policy, supra note 76.
184. The documents available for download include the following: Comcast's FCC
Compliance Plan and Descriptions of [Former] and [New] Network Management
Techniques. See Comcast's Network Management Disclosures, supra note 181. Following
the D.C. Circuit's decision, this correspondence remains. Id.
185. Id.
186. See FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 53.
187. Id. atpara. 52.
188. See Comcast, Frequently Asked Questions About Network Management,
http://help.comcast.net/content/faq/Frequently-Asked-Questions-about-Network-
Management#how (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
189. Comcast.net, Network Management, http://networkmanagement.comcast.net/NM-
update-01052009.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
Number 31
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL
In fairness, Comcast has provided the answers to all of these
questions; they are just buried and excessively complicated.' 90 The actual
specifics, including threshold levels and other important values, are only
available in the documents listed underthe Downloads section on the right-
hand side of the Web site.' 9' Even if a customer is able to locate this
information, the descriptions provided in these documents are highly
technical and confusing. When describing how its new network
management practices work, Comcast creates various terms to refer to each
of its many thresholds, such as "near congestion state," rather than just
simply stating the value. 192 Whether intended or not, naming the thresholds
in this way gives Comcast the flexibility to (1) bury the threshold values in
the hopes that the majority of its customers will give up after being
confronted by the vague and confusing description of its network
management practices and (2) subtly adjust threshold values without
having to change their "detailed" descriptions.
Does this rise to "misdirection and obfuscation"?' 93 Regardless, it
would not be too difficult for Comcast to generate a more thorough, yet
simple description of exactly how its practices work, including all
numerical threshold levels and numerical time intervals in a
straightforward manner. To illustrate this point, this may be a more suitable
description:
When a subscriber continuously uses more than [insert numerical
threshold] bandwidth over a period of [insert time interval (minutes)],
his or her status will be degraded. However, only when the network
enters a state of congestion [which occurs when .. .], will Comcast
slow a degraded user's connection speed. Degraded users will
experience slowed service equal to [insert bandwidth amount] for
[insert time interval (minutes)].
The bottom line is that it is hard to imagine a more complicated
description of network management practices than the one Comcast
provided to the FCC. In light of this discussion, the final Part of this Note
encourages the FCC to adopt a clear set of rules-similar to the framework
set forth in its Order-for ISP network management regulation.194
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS-BEYOND JURISDICTION,
REGULATIONS ARE NEEDED
The significance of the Internet in the lives of Americans underscores
190. See supra Part III.B. 1.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Comcast's New Practices, supra note 78, at 7.
193. FCC Order, supra note 5, at para. 53.
194. This is suggested in order to provide certainty for the benefit of both consumers and
ISPs.
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the importance of maintaining continued and widespread access. The first
step in achieving this goal is overcoming the FCC's current lack of
jurisdiction. As this Note discussed in Part III.A, the FCC could pursue
several alternative options to "reestablish" jurisdictional authority to
regulate network management practices. However, even if successful in
that endeavor, that is only the first step to effective regulation.
As the events that gave rise to the FCC Order suggest, explicit
regulations that monitor procedures and consequences are needed to
maintain the openness of the Internet. In Comcast's defense, it is not fair to
require for-profit corporations to follow nonexistent or vague rules and
then punish them on a case-by-case basis when they misstep. Despite a
growing need for such regulation, Congress and the FCC have indicated
their reluctance to adopt hard-and-fast rules, citing the dynamic nature of
both the Internet and the individual networks run by different ISPs.' 95 This
is a weak excuse. Regulation is needed to ensure that customers receive
continued access to the Internet and to provide ISPs with some idea as to
the framework within which they can manage bandwidth. The real question
then becomes this: how should regulations be designed?
This Note recommends that the FCC adopt, as a rule, the regulatory
framework outlined in its now-vacated Order. As the Order illustrated, the
standard is flexible enough to account for the government's concerns
relating to the dynamic nature of the Internet. Adopting the framework that
the FCC used in its adjudicative proceeding would not be inconsistent with
its past actions. The need to provide guidance for ISPs is another reason to
implement such regulations. This is exacerbated by the fact that network
management practices are costly and highly difficult to develop and deploy.
Without clear-cut rules, it is unfair for ISPs to make good-faith efforts to
implement "fair" or "acceptable" bandwidth management practices when
regulators have not provided any guidance as to what constitutes "fair" or
"acceptable" in the context of bandwidth management.
Until the D.C. Circuit derailed its efforts, the FCC was well on its
way to accomplishing this. On September 21, 2009, new FCC Chairman
Julius Genachowski outlined his commitment to "preserv[ing] the free and
open Internet" in a speech given at the Brookings Institute. 196 In his speech,
Genachowski proposed the addition of two new principles to the four set
forth in the Internet Policy Statement.197 The first principle "would prevent
195. See supra note 70.
196. Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski Outlines Actions To
Preserve the Free and Open Internet (Sept. 21, 2009), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-293567A1 .pdf [hereinafter
Genachowski Press Release].
197. Id.
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Internet access providers from discriminating against particular Internet
content or applications, while allowing for reasonable network
management."' 98 The second "would ensure that Internet access providers
are transparent about the network management practices they
implement."' 99 If these two new principles sound familiar, it is because
they come straight out of the FCC Order.200 Genachowski also indicated
that the revision process would include codifying the six Internet principles
and clarifying that each applies "to all platforms that access the Internet. '201
In late 2009, the FCC voted to codify the original four Internet principles as
well as the two new principles.2 2
However, merely adopting the framework set forth in the FCC Order
would not go far enough. The FCC needs to adopt a proactive monitoring
procedure for those ISPs who violate Internet regulations to ensure that
they actually fully comply with the Commission's regulatory mandates.
Asking an ISP to merely disclose what it is doing to remedy a violation
does not go far enough. Think of it as a form of corporate probation.
Finally, there also needs to be clear consequences for failing to comply
during this probationary period-consequences that will ensure that ISPs
play by the rules.
V. CONCLUSION
As Comcast has demonstrated, the lack of clear network management
rules opens the door for ISPs to engage, potentially, in both deceptive and
discriminatory network management practices. Comcast's pre-FCC Order
network management practices and its failure to design new network
management practices that fully comply with the FCC Order demonstrate
the need for clear rules and mandatory compliance monitoring by the FCC.
The first step in getting the move toward Internet regulation back on track
is "reestablishing" jurisdiction. Although the D.C. Circuit's decision is a
setback, it is not insurmountable. As this Note indicates, there are a number
of ways that the FCC can "reestablish" jurisdiction over network
management practices.
Anticipating that the FCC will succeed in "reestablishing" its
authority over these practices, this Note recommends that the FCC take a
hard look at whether Comcast actually complied with its FCC Order before
moving ahead with its planned regulatory regime. As this Note argues,
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
201. Genachowski Press Release, supra note 196.
202. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R. 13064, at paras. 88-132 (2009).
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Comcast's efforts fell short. Such a conclusion underscores the
shortcomings of the approach taken by the FCC in its Order and the
importance of adopting clear and enforceable Internet regulations. Comcast
also demonstrated that such regulations are only as good as the
enforcement mechanisms employed to ensure continued compliance.
Regulation should be backed by both FCC monitoring and significant
consequences for continued violations. By encouraging ISPs to develop
better network management practices, such an approach will ensure that the
Internet remains competitive and open long into the future.
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